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Recent Decisions
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-FALSE ADVERTISING-CORRECTIVE AD-
VERTISING REMEDY-The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia has held that the Federal Trade Commission's
cease and desist power encompasses corrective advertising orders
where past advertisements have played a substantial role in creat-
ing and reinforcing a false belief about the product and such belief
would linger after the false advertising ceases.
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 562 F.2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1575 (1978).
Listerine, a product of the defendant, Warner-Lambert Com-
pany, has been advertised since 1921 as an antiseptic mouthwash
effective for the relief of colds and their symptoms. As of 1938,
Listerine's label had included similar claims regarding colds and
sore throats. In 1972, the Federal Trade Commission (Commission)
issued a complaint' charging Warner-Lambert with violation of sec-
tion 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (Act) prohibiting
"[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in commerce ' 2 by representing Listerine as
effective in the prevention and cure of colds, their symptoms, and
sore throats. Two years later, pursuant to the hearings held before
an administrative law judge (ALJ),3 Warner-Lambert was found to
1. A similar complaint was issued in 1940 and following an evidentiary hearing, the
Commission dismissed the complaint without prejudice for future reinstitution should future
facts so warrant. Lambert Pharmacal Company, 38 F.T.C. 726 (1944). Other proceedings
involving Listerine advertising occurred in 1932, 1951, 1958, and 1962. None resulted in any
action against Listerine advertising.
Where the Commission has reason to believe that an unlawful act or practice has been or
is being used, it is authorized to issue and serve upon the alleged offender a complaint stating
the charges and affording the alleged offender the opportunity to appear and show cause why
a cease and desist order should not be entered by the Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp.
V 1975). Prior to issuing its formal complaint, the Commission will attempt to dispose of the
case through its Informal Enforcement Procedure. See Federal Trade Commission, 16 C.F.R.
§§ 2.21-.35 (1977). If an agreement is not reached, the Commission serves the party with a
"proposed complaint." A respondent's agreement to a consent order at this stage is as binding
as if the matter had been fully litigated. See id. § 2.32.
2. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970). The Act, as amended in 1975,
broadened the Commission's power by declaring unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce." Id. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
3. Where an agreement cannot be reached by the parties, both sides present evidence
before an administrative law judge, who is himself a member of the Commission. See Federal
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have misrepresented Listerine's effectiveness.'
In 1975, the Commission, in essentially affirming the ALJ's find-
ings,- ordered Warner-Lambert to cease and desist' from making
any further representations, directly or by implication, as to Lister-
ine's effectiveness against colds, colds' symptoms, and sore throats,
and to cease and desist from the dissemination of any advertising
of Listerine unless such advertisements clearly and conspicuously
disclosed that Listerine's prior advertisements had misrepresented
its efficacy.7 The corrective advertising portion of the order was to
continue until the company had expended approximately ten mil-
lion dollars in advertising, the equivalent of Listerine's average an-
nual advertising budget over the prior decade. Warner-Lambert
Trade Commission, 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.41-.46 (1977). The AIJ's decision may be appealed by
either party to the full Commission. See id. §§ 3.51-.55.
4. Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1484 (1975). The AIJ dismissed the allegations
as to the falseness of the company's claim that recent tests showed children who gargle with
Listerine twice a day have fewer and milder colds and miss fewer days of school due to colds
than children who do not gargle twice a day.
5. The Commission held that the evidence introduced did not support the ALJ's conclu-
sion as to customers' curative beliefs regarding Listerine.
6. If, after a hearing, "the Commission shall be of the opinion that the method of competi-
tion or the act or practice in question is prohibited . .. it .. .shall issue .. .an order
requiring such [party] ... to cease and desist from using such method of competition or
such act or practice." 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. V 1975).
7. Petitioner was ordered to cease and desist from disseminating any advertisement for
Listerine, regardless of content, unless it clearly and conspicuously disclosed in each such
advertisement that "[clontrary to prior advertising, Listerine will not help prevent colds or
sore throats or lessen their severity." 86 F.T.C. at 1513-14.
8. Corrective advertising, a newly fashioned remedy of the FTC, has as its purpose the
correction or eradication of consumers' false beliefs regarding a product or service. The beliefs
must be due to the advertiser's prior deceptive advertisements. As the advertisements would
continue to have some effect even after the cessation of the advertisements, the advertiser is
required to disseminate a message informing the public of the prior deception in all future
advertisements for some predetermined time period regardless of the accuracy and truthful-
ness of the principle advertisement. The topic has given rise to much controversy and a
proliferation of law review articles. See, e.g., Anderson & Winer, Corrective Advertising: The
FTC's New Formula for Effective Relief, 50 Tax. L. Rav. 312 (1972); Cornfeld, A New Ap-
proach to an Old Remedy: Corrective Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission, 61
IowA L. REv. 693 (1976); Lemke, Souped Up Affirmative Disclosure Orders of the Federal
Trade Commission, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 180 (1970); Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer
Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HAv. L. Rzv. 661 (1977); Thain, Advertising
Regulation: The Contemporary FTC Approach, 1 FORDHAM Usa. L.J. 349 (1973); Note, False
Advertising: The Expanding Presence of the FTC, 25 BAYLOR L. Rav. 650 (1973); Note, The
Limits of FTC Power to Issue Consumer Protection Orders, 40 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 496 (1972);
Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 85 H.Av. L. Rav.
477 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Corrective Advertising]; Note, Developments in the
Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HIAv. L. Rav. 1005 (1967).
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petitioned the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for review,'
and, in a 2-1 decision, the court affirmed the Commission's order
after deleting the confessional phrase."
The court initially determined that the Commission's conclusions
as to Listerine's ineffectiveness were supported by substantial evi-
dence" and then proceeded to analyze the scope of the Commis-
sion's cease and desist power. Relying on the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in FTC v. Dean Foods, 2 the majority noted that the Commission
clearly had the power to shape remedies going beyond the literal
meaning of a "cease and desist" order." Its analysis was then di-
rected to the question of whether a corrective advertising order was
outside the range of permissible remedies.' The majority briefly
examined the Act, including the 1975 amendments, 5 and concluded
that nothing in the legislative history of the Act removed corrective
advertising from the Commission's class of permissible remedies."
9. The court of appeals has the power to enter a decree affirming, modifying, or setting
aside an order of the Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
10. The court modified the order by deleting the phrase "[clontrary to prior advertising"
from the corrective advertising portion of the order. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d
749, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1575 (1978).
• 11. 562 F.2d at 753. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. V 1975) requires that the FTC make a report
stating its findings as to the facts and provides for review in the appropriate court of appeals.
"The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclu-
sive." Id. § 45(c) (1970). The courts have held that the Commission may only draw inferences
from findings of fact that are supported by "substantial evidence on the record considered
as a whole." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). The inferences drawn
by "the Commission are accorded great deference in view of the Commission's position as
the expert body in the area." Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 326 U.S. 608 (1946).
12. 384 U.S. 597 (1966). In Dean Foods, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's
authority to seek a preliminary injunction against the defendant's proposed merger, repudiat-
ing the Court's holding in FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927), that a Commis-
sion order requiring defendants to cease and desist from combining and cooperating in re-
straining competition could not include a divestiture order as the Commission had not "been
delegated the autority of a court of equity." Id. at 623.
13. The Commission's discretion in choosing a remedy is well established. The Commis-
sion as the expert body may determine what remedy is necessary to eliminate the unfair or
deceptive trade practices which have been disclosed. It has wide latitude for judgment and
the courts will not interfere except where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to
the unlawful practices found to exist. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 326 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946).
It has been suggested that the Commission's choice of remedies be "treated as a finding of
fact, subject to reversal only for lack of substanital evidentiary support." See Corrective
Advertising, supra note 8, at 499. For a general discussion of the limitations of the Commis-
sion's powers, see note 69 and accompanying text infra.
14. 562 F.2d at 757.
15. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 57b (Supp. V 1975).
16. 562 F.2d at 757-58.
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After summarily disposing of the first amendment issue 7 by cit-
ing from the Supreme Court's dictum in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.," that a
state could regulate the form and content of deceptive advertise-
ments, the majority embarked on an analysis of judicial precedent
and determined that the remedy of corrective advertising had been
"well established."" Prior affirmative disclosure cases established
the Commission's power to require an advertiser to disclose
"unfavorable facts" where an advertisement without the disclosure
was inherently misleading.20 On point, the majority reasoned, were
Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC21 and Waltham Watch Co. v.
FTC,2 where the accumulated impact of past advertising necessi-
17. The first amendment issue is intertwined with the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976), which recognized advertising as a form of speech protected by the first amendment.
Thus, the issues of chilling of first amendment rights and the constitutionality of compelling
speech through a corrective advertising order were raised in the appeal.
18. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, the Court invalidated a state's
ban on advertising of prescription drug prices.
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions.
It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent
and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensa-
ble.
Id. at 765.
Relying on the Court's dictum at footnote 24, that a state may "make it appropriate to
require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include such additional informa-
tion, warnings, and disclaimers as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive," id. at 771-
72 n.24 (emphasis added), the court in Warner-Lambert concluded that the first amendment
does not present "an obstacle" to the Commission's power to issue a'corrective advertising
order.
Although a proper examination of the first amendment issue is beyond the scope of this
paper, it is critical to note that the Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy was addressing
itself to advertisements which were intrinsically deceptive, like those in the affirmative dis-
closure cases. See notes 43-51 and accompanying text infra.
In denying Warner-Lambert's petition for rehearing, the court reexamined the effect of
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy on its ruling and concluded that it is "beyond doubt that
the FTC order is a valid one." 562 F.2d at 771 (en banc), The court's reasoning was consistent
with that expressed in the earlier opinion: future advertisements of Listerine, absent the
required disclosure, would continue the public deception. In concluding that the corrective
advertising order was the least restrictive means available to the Commission to correct the
violation, the court seems to have ignored the remedy provided the Commission by the 1975
amendment, the "public notification respecting the rule violation on the unfair or deceptive
act or practice." See notes 68-73 and accompanying text infra.
19. 562 F.2d at 757.
20. Id. at 759-61.
21. 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922).
22. 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963).
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tated that the respective advertisers disclose in future advertise-
ments that the products they were currently advertising had either
been substantially changed or were completely different products.
23
These cases, the majority concluded, indicated that the Commis-
sion had the power to order corrective advertising," and that as
applied here, corrective advertising bore a "reasonable relation" to
the unlawful practices found to exist and was, thus, an appropriate
remedy.2 5
Judge Robb dissented insofar as the Commission's order included
the remedy of corrective advertising.2 The 1975 amendments to the
Act,2 in his opinion, indicated that Congress neither believed the
23. 562 F.2d at 761.
24. Id. at 762, 764. The majority noted its limited role in reviewing a Commission order.
The judgment of the Commission, being that of an expert agency, is entitled to have its
chosen remedy enforced, unless the court finds that it bears no reasonable relation to the
unlawful practices found to exist. The court concluded that Warner-Lambert's own market
surveys, as interpreted by the Commission's experts, "constitute[d substantial evidence in
support of the need for corrective advertising in this case." Id. at 763.
The market surveys contained data collected on an aided recall basis. A sample of consum-
ers who were "exposed to a lot of Listerine advertising" were asked the following questions:
Thinking of the recent advertising you've seen or heard for each brand, which one of
the following main ideas do you feel the brand has been advertising: effective for colds
and sore throats, not too strong tasting, gives long lasting protection, recommended
by dentists, leaves mouth feeling refreshed, effective for bad breath, leaves no unpleas-
ant after-taste, effecive for killing germs, pleasant flavor.
Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1471 n.23 (1975) (emphasis added).
The Commission's experts' testimony as to the stability of consumers' beliefs, even during
the spring and summer months when the "colds theme" was not being advertised, was the
critical factor in the determination that corrective advertising was required to dissipate the
residual effects of the false advertising.
25. 562 F.2d at 764.
26. Id.
27. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2201 (1975), 15 U.S.C. § 57b (Supp. V 1975). The relevant portions of
the amendment state:
(a) (2) If any [party] .. .engages in any unfair or deceptive act or practice (within
the meaning or section 45(a) of this title) with respect to which the Commission has
issued a final cease and desist order. . . the Commission may commence a civil action
against such [party) . ..in a United States district court or in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction of a State. If the Commission satisfies the court that the act or
practice to which the cease and desist order relates is one which a reasonable man
would have known under the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent, the court may
grant relief under subsection (b) of this section.
(b) The court ... shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the court finds
necessary to redress injury to consumers or to other [parties] . ..resulting from the
rule violation or the unfair or deceptive act or practice, as the case may be. Such relief
may include, but shall not be limited to . ..public notification respecting the rule
violation or the unfair or deceptive act or practice, as the case may be; except that
1977-78
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Commission had, nor was intended to have, the power to order
"public notification" by way of corrective advertising." Judge Robb
distinguished the cases relied upon by the majority because the
affirmative disclosures in each were necessitated by the advertise-
ments' failure to reveal the material facts necessary to clarify repre-
sentations made in the advertisements. In the present case, how-
ever, the advertisements made pursuant to the cease and desist
order would be truthful on their face. The disclaimer would be solely
related to the uses advertised in the past and would, therefore,
exceed the prevention of "illegal practices in the future" as contem-
plated by the Act. Thus, the dissent concluded that the corrective
advertising order would improperly expand the Commission's statu-
tory power.Y
The Federal Trade Commission ActN serves as the basis for the
FTC's power to control the dissemination of false advertising. Al-
though the legislative history of the original Act provided no evi-
dence that Congress intended the Commission to control advertis-
ing,31 and although the Commission's authority to order the cessa-tion of false advertising had been doubted immediately following
nothing in this subsection is intended to authorize the imposition of any exemplary or
punitive damages.
15 U.S.C. §§ 57b(a)(2), 57b(b) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis supplied by Judge Robb, 562 F.2d
at 765).
28. 562 F.2d at 765.
29. Id. at 768. Judge Robb concluded by rejecting the proposition that the after-effects of
advertising which have been discontinued pursuant to a cease and desist order can thus
expand the Commission's statutory power to prevent future illegal practices. Id.
30. The Federal Trade Commission Act was enacted in 1914 as a result of general dissatis-
faction with the Supreme Court's diminution of the Sherman Act in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and in United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106 (1911). The Supreme Court had adopted a rule of interpretation, popularly known as "the
rule of reason," whereby only unreasonable restraints of trade would be proscribed by the
Sherman Act. For an examination of the social and political pressures culminating with the
congressional enactment of the Act, see G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMnssION 1-48
(1924) [hereinafter cited as HENDERSON]; Levy, A Decade of the Federal Trade Commission
(pts. 1-4), 11 VA. L. Rv. 21, 111, 196, 278 (1925); Montague, Anti-Trust Laws and the Federal
Trade Commission, 1914-1927, 27 COLUM. L. Rzv. 650 (1927). During the same congressional
session, the FTC's jurisdiction was greatly enlarged by the enactment of the Clayton Act
which prohibited certain enumerated transactions, such as price discrimination, tying agree-
ments, and interlocking directorates, and empowered the FTC to enforce compliance with the
Act's provisions.
31. The Commission's jurisdiction in the field of misbranding and deceptive advertising
has been referred to as "a more or less fortuitous by-product rather than the result of a clear
legislative design." HENDERSON, supra note 30, at 339. But see Montague, Unfair Methods of
Competition, 25 YALE L.J. 20, 24-25 (1915).
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the enactment of the original Act,32 the Supreme Court's ruling in
Winstead Hosiery Co. v. FTC3 and the Wheeler-Lea Amendmentu
of 1938 put such misgivings to a rest.
The Supreme Court in Winstead Hosiery held that the Commis-
sion had the authority to order the discontinuance of deceptive acts,
including advertising, when such acts "constituted an unfair
method of competition. ."35 From the numerous decisions following
Winstead Hosiery," two distinct lines of cases can be discerned. The
first involves the issuance of a cease and desist order in the vein of
"go and sin no more." Orders to simply cease and desist from mis-
representing one's product or service have been issued where the
advertiser misrepresented the composition or ingredients in his
product,'! its efficacy,3 8 or its price, 39 and in numerous other situa-
32. See, e.g., Winstead Hosiery Co. v. FTC, 272 F. 957 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 258 U.S. 483
(1922). The Second Circuit held: "Assuming that some consumers are misled because .. .
some retailers deliberately deceive them .. .the result is in no way connected with unfair
competition." Id. at 960-61. See also L.B. Silver Co. v. FTC, 289 F. 985, 992 (6th Cir. 1923)
(Denison, J., dissenting).
33. 258 U.S. 483 (1922) (the manufacturer of knit underwear was ordered to discontinue
the use of labels which falsely represented his product as 100% wool). In the first false
advertising case to reach the courts, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919),
the court upheld the Commission's authority to order the cessation of advertising where the
advertisements falsely represented lower prices for sugars, teas, and coffees as being the by-
products of quantity discounts offered the company, and that its commodities were purchased
from selected brands abroad.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970) (amended 1975). In FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643
(1931), the Supreme Court held that, absent some harm to competition, the Commission had
no jurisdiction to issue cease and desist orders. The decision prompted Congress to enact the
Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938. The Commission's jurisdiction over "unfair methods of competition
in commerce" was enlarged so as to include the control of "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices," thus extending the Act's protection against deception of the general public. To
increase the Commission's effectiveness, Congress made the Commission's orders self-
executing, with a civil penalty for the violation of a final order (15 U.S.C. § 45(g)(1) (1970)),
provided for authority to seek injunctive relief pending the issuance of a complaint and until
final disposition of the case (15 U.S.C. § 53 (1970)), and established a criminal sanction
enforceable by the Attorney General upon information from the FTC (15 U.S.C. § 54(a)
(1970)).
35. 258 U.S. at 494. The Court held that where "[the labels in question are literally false
. ..[and] attract customers by means of the fraud which they perpetrate, trade is diverted
from the producer of truthfully marked goods." Id. at 493.
36. See, e.g., FTC v. Kay, 35 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1929) (product falsely advertised and
distributed as radium); Fox Film Corp. v. FTC, 296 F. 353 (2d Cir. 1924) (old motion pictures
misrepresented as new films never before seen); Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744
(2d Cir. 1922) (phosphate baking powder misrepresented as cream of tartar baking powder).
37. Guarantee Veterinary Co. v. FTC, 285 F. 853 (2d Cir. 1922) (salt blocks advertised as
containing 16 medicinal ingredients).
38. Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1968) (throat
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tions such as misrepresenting the products' geographic origin, 0 the
enterprise's business status," or the quality of the competing prod-
ucts.'2
The second line of cases involves cease and desist orders incorpo-
rating some form of affirmative disclosure in the future advertise-
ments of the products. 3 The products had been presented as effec-
tive for specific maladies and the disclosures were required because
the use of the products would be ineffective for the majority of
consumers whose purchase decision would be based on the adver-
tisements' general curative claims. The advertisements, without the
required disclosures, were misleading on their face." Thus, where
lozenges advertised as effective in relief of sore throats, including "strep throat").
39. Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1963) (fictitious suggested retail price).
40. Harsam Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1959) (domestic perfumes repre-
sented as French perfumes).
41. Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960) (salesmen
represented as "trichologists").
42. Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963) (disparaging competing
products by attributing inferiorities to them they did not possess).
43. Where, for example, an iron supplement product was advertised as helpful in the relief
of tiredness, though the product was only effective if the consumer suffered from an iron
deficiency, a cease and desist order was framed so that the advertiser could continue to
advertise his product as helpful in the relief of tiredness but only for those individuals
suffering from an iron deficiency. See J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
44. See, e.g., Id. (tiredness); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960) (bedwetting); Ward
Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.) (baldness), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960);
Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960) (baldness).
The earliest case upholding a cease and desist order which incorporated a form of affirma-
tive disclosure was Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922). The court
affirmed the Commission's order that the company cease from representing its new baking
powder as the previous product it had manufactured, and that it delete the word "cream"
from the product's name and incorporate the word "phosphate" so as to inform consumers
of the product's new ingredient. The court agreed with the Commission's finding that peti-
tioner, in the use of its labels and otherwise, was employing false and misleading advertising,
which was calculated and designed to deceive the public, and which did deceive the public
into buying a phosphate baking powder believing that it was the Dr. Price's Baking Powder
which had been well known for 60 years as a cream of tartar powder, concealing and obscuring
the fact that it was a radically different powder. Id. at 753.
In another early case, upon which many of the affirmative disclosure cases rely, Haskelite
Mfg. Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1942), the court sustained the Commission's order
requiring that the company clearly disclose on its synthetic buffet trays or upon the individual
cartons that the trays, although indistinguishable from wood and advertised as wood, were
really only covered with processed paper. The court reasoned that "[wlithout some warning,
the trays themselves are almost certain to deceive the buying public." Id. at 766. The court's
primary concern was with the Commission's authority to proscribe an unlawful practice after
it had ceased, viewing the disclosure as a guarantee against a recurrence of the past unlawful
acts.
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the product's advertisements are misleading or deceptive due to the
advertisements' implied claims that the product will be beneficial
for all individuals who suffer from a certain malady, such as bald-
ness, bedwetting, or tiredness, a simple cease and desist order would
preclude all advertising of the product unless the order was framed
so as to preclude only the general curative claims.45
In one of the first contemporary cases seeking an affirmative dis-
closure order, Alberty v. FTC, 11 the Commission was held to lack the
authority to require the disclosure that the product would be effec-
tive in only rare instances." Ten years later, in Keele Hair & Scalp
Specialists v. FTC," the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals approved a
cease and desist order compelling the advertiser to affirmatively
disclose that its product would not cure male-pattern baldness, the
prevalent form of baldness." -In Keele and its progeny, J.B. Wil-
Only one of the cases cited by the court involved an order requiring affirmative disclosure,
NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941). There, the Court affirmed the order,
though modifying it by deleting the confessional portion of the order, on the basis of § 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970), expressly authorizing affirma-
tive action in addition to cease and desist orders. No such provision exists in the Federal
Trade Commission Act. See Oettle, The Power of the NLRB to Order Affirmative Action, 5
HAjv. LEGAL COMMENTARY 236 (1968).
45. The disclosures were designed to prevent similar future claims from being misleading.
Because the future advertising of these products would have to refer to the products' pur-
poses, the required disclosure would prevent the public from being misled into believing that
the products would be effective regardless of the malady's cause. See Note, Corrective Adver-
tising, supra note 8, at 489-90.
46. 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
47. In deleting the portion of the order requiring the affirmative disclosures, the majority
stated:
We are concerned with the scope of the power thus sought by the Commission ....
Such a requirement seems to us to have no relation to the prevention of falsity in
advertising. It is a wholly different power.
. . . Both [the] purpose and terms [of the Act] are to prevent falsity and fraud, a
negative restriction. When the Commission goes beyond that purpose and enters upon
the affirmative task of encouraging advertising which it deems properly informative,
it exceeds its authority.
Id. at 39.
48. 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960).
49. Id. at 23. In Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960), petitioners were engaged in the
leasing of a device for the prevention of enuresis (bed-wetting). The Commission found that
the device would not be effective in the majority of cases, those involving an organic defect
or disease, and ordered petitioners to so disclose in their future advertisements. The court,
in sustaining the Commission's order, read Alberty as only requiring a finding that the
advertisements would be misleading in a material respect without the required disclosure.
Referring to the Alberty court's footnoted reference to both sections five and twelve of the
Act, the Feil court concluded that the holding was based on the narrower provisions of section
twelve, 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), which prohibit the false advertising of foods, drugs, devices,
1977-78
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liams Co. v. FTC,50 the courts sustained the Commission's orders on
the basis of the Commission's findings that the advertisements
would be misleading in a material respect unless accompanied by
disclosures stating the improbability of success. 51
Having gained approval of its affirmative disclosure orders, the
FTC in Campbell Soup Co.5" asserted it had the authority to order
corrective advertising, though declining to exercise it in that case. 3
The remedy was first employed when Continental Baking Company
consented to a corrective advertising order involving its Profile
Bread.54 Although subsequent consent decrees have been negotiated
and accepted by the Commission,55 the Warner-Lambert court is the
first to uphold the FTC's authority to require corrective advertising.
In its analysis of the judicial precedent, the court apparently
distinguished two categories of affirmative disclosure cases. The
and cosmetics. This reading, however, is questionable as the case was not remanded for futher
findings. See Corrective Advertising, supra note 8, at 499.
50. 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
51. Id. at 890.
52. 77 F.T.C. 664 (1970). Campbell Soup Co. had run television commecials showing its
soup with a rich and thick consistency by placing marbles at the bottom of the soup bowl. A
consumer protection group, Students Opposing Unfair Practices (SOUP), unsuccessfully at-
tempted to intervene in the Campbell action by petitioning the Commission to withdraw its
provisional acceptance of a consent decree whereby Campbell would be prohibited from using
similar techniques in the future, and instead order corrective advertising.
Corrective advertising would require that a party, who has falsely advertised, expend a
certain portion of their advertising space and time to dissipate the residual or lag effects of
the past false advertising, regardless of the truthfulness and accuracy of the future advertis-
ing. It is similar in nature to the affirmative action orders of the NLRB, see note 44 supra,
and the affirmative disclosure requirements of the Food and Drug Administration, both done
pursuant to an explicit grant of such power. National Labor Relations Act, 21 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1970); Food & Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (1970).
53. The Commission concluded: "We have no doubt as to the Commission's power to
require such affirmative disclosures when such disclosures are reasonably related to the
deception found and are required in order to dissipate the effects of that deception." 77 F.T.C.
at 668. The Commission, however, concluded that corrective advertising was not warranted
in the action.
Subsequent assertions of such authority came in the complaints against the Standard Oil
Co. of California by implying that its gasoline additive "F-310" had a significant effect on
the reduction of air pollution, Standard Oil Co. of Calif., [1970] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19,428, and against ITT Continental Baking Co. for implying that eating Profile Bread
would lead to weight reduction, ITT Continental Baking Co., 79 F.T.C. 248 (1971).
54. ITT Continental Baking Co., 79 F.T.C. 248 (1971). Continental Baking Co. allegedly
misrepresented the calories per slice of bread as lower than those of other breads and therefore
as effective in weight reduction. The fewer calories per slice were due to the slices being
thinner.
55. See, e.g., Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 1473 (1973); Shangri-La
Indus., 81 F.T.C. 596 (1972); Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 975 (1972).
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first required the disclosure of some material facts without which
the advertising would be misleading." The second category of cases
were identified as those requiring affirmative disclosure where "an
advertisement, although not misleading if taken alone, becomes
misleading considered in light of past advertisements.F'57
In the two cases discussed by the majority from the second cate-
gory, Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC5 and Waltham Watch Co.
v. FTC,"' the Commission's affirmative disclosure orders were sus-
tained by the courts. In Royal, the order required that the company
cease from representing its new product, containing phosphates, as
its prior product, which had contained the more expensive cream of
tartar, and ordered the company to delete the word "cream" from
the product's name and incorporate the word "phosphate" in its
labels and future advertisements.0
In Waltham, the original manufacturer of Waltham watches,
after ceasing production, transferred its tradename, trademark, and
goodwill to a successor corporation. The successor imported its
watches but advertised them as a "product of the Waltham Watch
Company since 1850." The Commission ordered the company to
cease and desist from using the Waltham name as an aid in selling
its product unless it disclosed in all future advertisements that the
product was not manufactured by the original Waltham Company
and that the product was imported.
The majority's reading of the above two cases focused on the
reputation that the products had established." However, Royal and
Waltham involved advertisements which falsely represented new
products as-the products proffered in the past. The public was in-
tentionally deceived into buying product A where the advertised
product was B. The plain and simple fact is that the advertisements
of these products would be deceptive in the absence of a disclosure
that, although the names were the same, the products were differ-
56. J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967) (tiredness); Feil v. FTC, 285
F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960) (bedwetting); Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.)
(baldness), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960); Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC,
275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960) (baldness).
57. 562 F.2d at 760.
58. 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922).
59. 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963).
60. See note 44 supra.
61. 562 F.2d at 761.
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ent.6 2 In Warner-Lambert, on the other hand, it was only the effect
of the past advertising that the Commission wished to eradicate.
Neither the product nor its ingredients had been altered. Thus, the
facts in Royal and Waltham presented the court with an issue differ-
ent from that in Warner-Lambert, and neither case can serve as
authority for the Commission's power to issue the corrective ,adver-
tising order it did.
The majority, however, seemed to proceed on the assumption that
Dean Foods, an antitrust case, established the basis for the Com-
mission's wide discretion in developing appropriate remedies for all
cases. The Commission's orders in antitrust cases, however, are di-
rected at activities which, because of their ongoing nature, are viola-
tive of the antitrust laws and are therefore unlawful . 3 Such is not
62. In its opinion, the majority rejected the dissent's contention that the labels and
advertising were false and misleading on their face. The advertisements and labels, the
majority stated, were "strictly truthful" and only became misleading when considered in light
of the past advertisements. The majority's conclusion, however, runs contrary to the respec-
tive courts' opinions, that the basis of the actions was the deceptive nature of the advertise-
ments and labels. Id. at 760 n.57.
In Royal, the court stated: "The Commission found that the advertising was false and
misleading, in representing to the public that the price of said new phosphate baking powder
had been reduced to about one-half its former cost, when in fact the price of said powder had
been at all times the same." 281 F. at 749. The court went on to conclude that "the fact that
the manufacturer is passing off one of this products for another . . .[is a] deception of the
public." Id. at 753. See also note 44 supra.
In Waltham, the court's reasoning was similar. "The owner of a trademark or tradename
may not use, nor permit the use of such trademark or tradename in a manner designed to
deceive the public." 318 F.2d at 31.
63. To be sure, the Commission's view that the residual effects of false advertising repre-
sent a continuing injury to the public and to competition is unquestioned. The test estab-
lished by the Commission and approved by the court states:
Thus, if a deceptive advertisement has played a substantial role in creating or reinforc-
ing in the public's mind a false and material belief which lives on after the false
advertising ceases, there is clear and continuing injury to competition and to the
consuming public as consumers continue to make purchasing decisions based on the
false belief. Since this injury cannot be averted by merely requiring respondent to cease
disseminating the advertisement, we may appropriately order respondent to take af-
firmative action designed to terminate the otherwise continuing ill effects of the
advertisement.
86 F.T.C. at 1499-1500 (emphasis added). However, as the test indicates, corrective advertis-
ing is aimed at the "ill effects of the [prior] advertisement" and not at the continuing
activity, such as an illegal merger, which is in itself unlawful.
As stated in Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1974), "the Commission was not
given the power to recast the consequence of conduct occurring prior to its entry of an order;
Congress was unwilling to subject the operation of a business to the risk of subsequent
Commission condemnation." In the accompanying footnote the court goes on: "We sympa-
thize with the Commission's problem. Under the present design of the Act, those sufficiently
Vol. 16: 797
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the case with these advertisements. The Commission's wide discre-
tion to mold its cease and desist orders in antitrust actions 4 does
not establish the Commission's authority to order corrective adver-
tising where the activity involves a facially truthful and accurate
advertisement.
Recognizing that the Commission was constrained to a "range of
permissible remedies" under the Act, the majority analyzed the
effect of the 1975 amendments to the Act" and concluded that the
amendments "did not remove corrective advertising from the class
of permissible remedies."" As the dissent pointed out, however, the
issue was not whether the amendment or any other portion of the
Act prohibited the use of corrective advertising as a remedy, but
whether such remedy was within the Commission's arsenal of reme-
dies under the Act.07
In any FTC action, especially one concerned with the regulation
of commercial speech, a key question must be whether the Commis-
sion has the power to require the particular remedy chosen. That the
"Commission has a wide discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed
adequate to cope with the unlawful practices in [an] area of trade
and commerce" is unquestioned." That its discretion is not un-
bounded is illustrated in cases where the courts have refused to
sustain or have modified Commission orders.6 Because the Com-
mission's orders are generally deemed to be prospective in nature,70
the test that has emerged is whether the remedy selected bears a
"reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist. ''71
unscrupulous or reckless to engage in conduct clearly forbidden by the Act, may do so until
a cease and desist order is entered, escaping with the fruits of the violation." Id. at 325 n.16.
64. L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971) (divestiture order); Charles Pfizer
& Co., Inc. v. FrC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968) (compulsory licensing of a patent), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969); Luria Bros. & Co. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847 (3d Cir.) (order limiting
purchases between parties), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968).
65. See note 27 supra.
66. 562 F.2d at 758.
67. Id. at 766.
68. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611 (1946). Accord, Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC,
381 U.S. 357 (1965); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
69. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683,706 (1948) (order may not be punitive); Heater
v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 323-24 (9th Cir. 1974) (order requiring restitution of monies not within
the Commission's power); Rodale Press, Inc. v. FTC, 407 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (unlawful
practice had been discontinued); J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 891 (6th Cir. 1967)
(order too broad).
70. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
71. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FIC, 327 U.S. 608, 611 (1946). Accord, FTC v. National Lead Co.,
352 U.S. 419 (1957). An alternate interpretation of the Siegel holding is whether the remedy
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In enacting the 1975 amendments, Congress recognized the lim-
ited scope of the Commission's cease and desist power72 and there-
fore provided it with additional remedies," including "public notifi-
cation" of unlawful practices where the Commission had issued a
final cease and desist order and could show that the respondent had
acted in bad faith. The majority differentiated public notification
from corrective advertising by stating that public notification is a
more general term with the remedy directed at past consumers.7
Although it is true that public notification is a more general term,
it is also a less onerous remedy in that only "notification" of the rule
violation is required." A corrective advertising campaign, on the
other hand, has as its goal the dissipation of the lag effects" of
was truly necessary, "whether the Commission abused its discretion in concluding that no
change short of. . . excision of the tradename would give adequate protection." 327 U.S. at
612. This narrower reading of Siegel would require that the Commission choose the least
damaging or restrictive remedy in order to accomplish its objective.
72. Senator Moss, a co-sponsor of the 1975 amendment, indicated a similar belief.
The Federal Trade Commission's improvements specified in the bill will afford, in my
opinion, long-term improvement in the fairness of the American marketplace. No
longer will the Federal Trade Commission be confined to slapping the wrists of persons
who engage in unfair or deceptive practices and telling them not to do it again.
120 CONG. REc. 49,612 (1974).
73. See note 27 supra.
74. The majority answered in the alternative that a subsequent congressional grant could
not be veiwed as affirmative proof that the Commission did not have such power prior to the
congressional enactment. Congress might have enacted the legislation to avoid adverse con-
tentions and litigation. 562 F.2d at 758 n.39. See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 610
(1966); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). But see note 72 supra.
75. See note 27 supra.
76. The lag effects of advertising refer to the effects that persist subsequent to the running
of a commercial or advertisement. Although the duration of the effects of an advertisement
vary with the type of product being advertised, the content of the advertisement, competitive
advertisements, and numerous other factors, it is generally agreed in the current marketing
literature that the direct effects of advertising become minimal after a period of one year.
Much of the earlier research in advertising lag effects was performed with yearly data which
resulted in advertising decay periods of up to five years and more. Clarke, Econometric
Measurement of the Duration of the Advertising Effect on Sales, 13 J. MAKETING RESEARCH
347 (1976), found that the "average implied duration interval derived from annual data is
more than 17 times as long as the average implied duration interval from monthly data." Id.
at 350. For weekly data, the average implied duration interval was less than /2 that of the
monthly data. He concludes that "the published econometric literature indicates that 90%
of the cumulative effects of advertising on sales of mature, frequently purchased, low priced
products occurs within 3-9 months of the advertising. The conclusion that advertising's effect
on sales lasts for months rather than years is strongly supported." Id. at 355. See generally
K. PALDA, THE MEASUREMENT OF CUMULATIVE ADVERTISING EFnmcws (1964); Appeal, On Adver-
tising Wearout, 11 J. ADVERTISING RESEARCH 11 (1971); Burtt & Dobell, The Curve of Forget-
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advertising, connoting a reeducation of the consuming public,
which, in the case of Listerine, would require the inclusion of the
mandated corrective advertising copy in the next $10 million of
advertising. For a district court to issue an order compelling public
notification, the Commission must show a bad faith violation of the
Commission's cease and desist order. Yet, under the majority's rea-
soning, a cease and desist order incorporating the more onerous
corrective advertising remedy requires no showing of bad faith. In
addition, although corrective advertising is directed at "future con-
sumers," the intent in issuing the order is clearly to eradicate the
false beliefs held by present consumers. In other words, corrective
advertising's aim is to redress the injury resulting from the product's
past false advertising by eliminating that portion of consumer's
beliefs or images due to the deceptive advertising. Thus, corrective
advertising would, of necessity, relate solely to past advertising and
would, therefore, exceed the Commission's mandate of preventing
illegal practices in the future." The Commission's prospective cease
and desist powers cannot be expanded to include the power to order
corrective advertising where the goal would necessarily be to dispel
the residual effects of advertisements which have been discontinued
pursuant to a cease and desist order.78
Having determined that the Commission had the authority to
order corrective advertising, the majority held that the standard
adopted by the Commission for the imposition of corrective adver-
tising was "entirely reasonable."" The FTC standard dictates two
ting for Advertising Material, 11 J. Awuw PSYCHOLOGY 5 (1972); Craig, Sternthal & Leavitt,
Advertising Wearout: An Experimental Analysis, 16 J. ADVEMRSING RESEARCH 25 (1976); Dyer
& Kuehl, The "Corrective Advertising" Remedy of the FTC: An Experimental Evaluation,
36 J. MARKEING 27 (1974); Greenberg & Suttoni, Television Commercial Wearout, 13 J.
ADvEMSING RESEARCH 47 (1973); Griliches, Distributed Lags: A Survey, 35 ECONOMETmCS 1
(1967); Hunt, Effects of Corrective Advertising, 13 J. ADVERTISING RESEARCH 15 (1973); Simon,
The Effect of Advertising on Liquor Brand Sales, 6 J. MARKEnNG RESEARCH (1969).
77. See Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974). Although the court in Heater was
concerned with the Commission's authority to order the restitution of monies secured through
deceptive practices, the court's analysis of the scope of the Commission's "cease and desist"
order is equally applicable to the Warner-Lambert case. In both cases, the Commission's
concern was with the "lingering effects" of the unlawful act or practice and the "continuing
injury" they entailed. Are consumers who have been defrauded of their life savings any less
injured then consumers who are deceived into thinking that a slice of some bread has fewer
calories than a slice of another? Are the lingering effects of the deceptive advertisements in
the consumers' minds more onerous than the lingering effects on the consumers' depleted life
savings?
78. 562 F.2d at 768.
79. Id. at 762.
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factual inquiries: first, whether the advertisements played a sub-
stantial role in creating or reinforcing a false belief about the prod-
uct; and, second, whether the belief would linger after the false
advertising ceases.0 If the answer to these two questions is yes, then
corrective advertising is justified. By way of dictum, the majority
proceeded to lay the foundation for shifting the burden of proof to
defendant companies by stating that in some cases it would be
appropriate "to presume the existence of the two factual predicates
for corrective advertising. ' 81
As desirable as the remedy of corrective advertising may be in
certain circumstances, it is just as potent and dangerous. Under the
guidelines proposed by the Commission and approved by the court,
almost any advertising found to be misleading could be subject to
a corrective advertising order. Such power in the hands of an agency
which is prosecutor, judge, and jury must be scrutinized and
granted only if appropriate guidelines are provided. The Commis-
sion has recently charged the makers of Anacin, Bufferin, Bayer,
Cope, Excedrin, Excedrin PM, Midol, and Vanquish with false and
misleading advertising and is seeking corrective advertising orders
for each product. Since there are substantial questions concerning
the Commission's authority to issue corrective advertising orders,
those potential cases may provide further judicial analysis of the
subject.
The Supreme Court has denied Warner-Lambert's appeal, pre-
sumably to give the various circuits an opportunity to provide addi-
tional input regarding the extent to which the Commission's power
may be expanded. In the case of corrective advertising, the burden
on the lower courts is increased as they must give due consideration
to the newly recognized but as yet uncharted protection afforded to
commercial speech. In approaching their task, the courts would do
well to consider the Supreme Court's admonition in FTC v.
Raladam: "Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms
and necessary implications of the grant. If broader powers be desira-
ble they must be conferred by Congress. They cannot be merely
assumed by administrative officers; nor can they be created by the
courts in the proper exercise of their judicial function."8
Marcel Weiner
80. See note 64 supra.
81. 562 F.2d at 762.
82. 283 U.S. 643, 649 (1931).
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